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INTRODUCTION
The public morals exception in Article XX of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could and should be interpreted in
accordance with evolving human rights law on women's rights.' This
clause provides an exception to the general rule that members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) cannot take measures against other
Members that would restrict trade. Under Article XX, WTO members
may restrict trade for a variety of social reasons, including protecting
the environment, preventing prison labor, and otherwise promoting
"public morals.",2 This Note will argue in particular that a nation should
be allowed to invoke the public morals exception in order to protect
women's rights. In the Turtles case, the Appellate Body of the WTO
stated that Article XX should be understood in light of evolving inter-
national law and, in particular to that case, with respect to evolving
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School, expected May 2001; A.B., Occidental
College. I am grateful to Professor Robert Howse for his helpful comments. This Note has
also benefited from comments by Christopher Evers, Kathleen Wadell, and Natalie Wheeler.
1. The public morals exception is contained in Article XX(a) of the GATT. See Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. Id. Although "public morals" are never defined in the GATT, the term is generally
understood to mean that a country may protect its own public morals or the public morals of
another country. The quintessential example in the academic literature is a nation protecting
against the importation of pornography. See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in
Trade Policy, 38 Va. J. Int'l L. 689, 716-17 (1998) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Moral Excep-
tion].
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international environmental law.3 Although this reference in the Turtles
case may amount to no more than dicta, there are feminist policy rea-
sons for extending this analysis to the public morals exception.
Globalization harms women more than men.4 Increased globaliza-
tion unites Western notions of patriarchy and economic efficiency with
other countries' entrenched legal and social manifestations of patriar-
chy, perpetuating the dismal status of women within those countries.
For example, gendered, racist, colonialist, and classist ideas are used to
justify contingent employment arrangements in which women perform
unskilled labor.' Within these contingent arrangements, inhumane labor
practices remain pervasive.6 Women are more likely to be targets of il-
legal labor practices, including low wages, resistance to unionization,
pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, and/or rape in the work-
place. Feminist scholars have increasingly called upon the international
3. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Re-
port of the Appellate Body, Oct. 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, 38 I.L.M. 118 [hereinafter
Turtles].
4. See, e.g., Lori J. Pennay, The Disproportionate Effect of the Asian Economic Crisis
on Women: the Filipina Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 427 (2000) (detailing how
the Asian Economic crisis in 1996 disproportionately affected women in Asia and how their
governments' attempts to remedy the crisis have not alleviated their dire situations); Eliza-
beth Olson, Free Markets Leave Women Worse Off, UNICEF Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 23,
1999, at A9 (discussing a UNICEF study of twenty-seven former-Soviet Eastern European
nations in which unemployment, contingent work arrangements, and marginal wages among
women have increased due to the transition to a market economy).
5. See Maria L. Ontiveros, A Vision of Global Capitalism That Puts Women And Peo-
ple of Color at the Center, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 33-35 (1999). "Contingent
work" is any work that is not permanent, full-time work and that usually offers low wages
and does not provide health insurance, pension or retirement benefits. Id. at 29. Women are
most often the ones laboring in contingent arrangements. Id. at 33. In Japan, for example,
more women are contingent workers than men. The government's policies on contingent
work arrangements help to perpetuate women's inferior status in the economy. Governmen-
tal rules limit temporary workers to one-year contracts and prevent companies from
immediately rehiring them for the same job, while simultaneously using subsidies to encour-
age these same companies to keep permanent employees whose positions are no longer
needed. Thus, the government keeps men in permanent positions but restricts women from
entering the highly patriarchal Japanese corporate workforce as permanent employees. How-
ard W. French, Economy's Ebb in Japan Spurs Temporary Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1999,
at Al. Some Japanese corporations are trying to alleviate the plight of Japanese female
workers. See World Watch-Asia: Mazda to Raise Pay, Jobs for Women, WALL ST. J., Aug.
5, 1999, at AI4.
6. See Ontiveros supra note 5, at 31.
7. See id. at 34-36. See also Michelle Smith, Potential Solutions to the Problems of
Pregnancy Discrimination in Maquiladoras Operated by U.S. Employers in Mexico, 12
BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 195, 195 (1998); Elizabeth Spahn, Shattered Jade, Broken Shoe:
Foreign Economic Development and the Sexual Exploitation of Women in China, 50 ME. L.
REV. 255, 265-71 (1998); Somini Sengupta, Squeezed by Debt and Time, Mothers Ship Ba-
bies to China, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 1999 at Al (reporting that, in New York, many female
illegal immigrants from China have turned to sending their children to China because they
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legal community to re-evaluate and restructure economic policies that
perpetuate the poverty of and violence against women.'
This Note will demonstrate how human rights concerns for women
should be addressed through the public morals exception of Article XX
of the GATT. The first section will argue that there is a legal basis for
uniting trade law and human rights law. The second section will show
that there is a textual basis for interpreting the public morals exception
in light of evolving international human rights law. The final section
will provide examples of where the public morals exception could be
invoked to protect women's rights.
I. UNITING TRADE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The WTO is not the best forum in which to advance women's rights
because it lacks feminist scholars. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (DSU) requires:
[Panelists must be] well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals, including persons who have served
on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a repre-
sentative to the Council or Committee of any covered
agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat,
taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.9
cannot afford to care for the children on their low wages and in such dismal living condi-
tions); Marlise Simons, Agadir Journal; After the Rape, a Lifetime of Shame. It's Morocco,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1999, at A3 (discussing the plight of unwed women in a fish cannery in
Agadir, Morocco).
8. See, e.g., Ann D. Jordan, Human Rights, Violence Against Women, and Economic
Development (The People's Republic of China Experience), 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 216,
243 (1996) (providing a thorough evaluation of how mainstream economic development
policies perpetuate violence against women and, in particular, how such policies have
harmed women in the People's Republic of China). Recently, the World Bank launched
Gendernet, a website that which provides information on its gender research, policies, and
programs. See World Bank Gendernet, http://www.worldbank.org/gender/ (last modified
Feb. 23, 2001); see also Jane Dwasi, Kenya: a Study in International Labor Standards and
Their Effect on Working Women in Developing Countries: the Case for Integration of En-
forcement Issues in the World Bank's Policies, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 347, 448 (1999) (noting
that the World Bank has undertaken a number of "women in development" projects aimed at
improving the status of women); see also JOSETTE L. MURPHY, GENDER ISSUES IN WORLD
BANK LENDING 1, 23 (1995).
9. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Dispute Settlement Understanding, April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, art. 8(1)
(1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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In addition, the DSU stipulates that the Appellate Body shall be
comprised of "persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the
covered agreements generally."' The DSU further requires that
members of the panels and the Appellate Body be of sufficiently diverse
backgrounds and be broadly representative of the WTO membership."
Members of the current Appellate Body are all male: Yasuhei Taniguchi
of Japan, G.M. Abi-Saab of Egypt, A.V. Ganesan of India, James
Bacchus of the United States, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann of Germany,
Florentino Feliciano of the Philippines, and Julio Lacarte-Mur6 of
Uruguay. 2
While all of these men are highly esteemed scholars and practitio-
ners, none have produced any scholarship that suggests that they are the
best candidates to address the resolution of trade disputes affecting
women. While it would be hyperbole to state that the WTO is structur-
ally gendered, it is fair to state that the WTO's highest body, which is
the forum of last resort and which has exclusive and binding power over
trade issues, has no member with a history of promoting feminist legal
theory and women's issues. This dramatically reduces the WTO's le-
gitimacy as a world body committed to sustainable development.
An international organization that excludes or marginalizes
women's voices, whether with respect to women's issues or to the rep-
resentation of women within the organization, cannot claim
objectivity.'3 As Professors Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright explain:
Long-term domination of all bodies wielding political power
nationally and internationally means that issues traditionally of
concern to men become seen as general human concerns, while
"women's concerns" are relegated to a special, limited category.
Because men generally are not the victims of sex discrimina-
tion, domestic violence, and sexual degradation and violence,
10. DSU, supra note 9, art. 17(3).
11. See id. arts. 8(2), 17(3).
12. For the backgrounds of the current members of the Appellate Body, see World
Trade Organization, WTO Press Release 32: WTO Announces Appointment to Appellate
Body, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres95-e/prO32_.e.htm (last modified Nov. 29,
1995); World Trade Organization, WTO Press Release 179: WTO Completes Appointment of
Appellate Body Members, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres00_e/prl79-e.htm (last
modified May 25, 2000).
13. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
379, 392 (1999) (explaining how feminist methods seek to expose and question the limited
bases of international law's claim to objectivity and impartiality and insisting on the impor-
tance of gender relations as a category of analysis).
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for example, these matters can be consigned to a separate sphere
and tend to be ignored.'4
The WTO can increase its legitimacy and ability to respond to the
particular situation of women in several ways. The WTO should employ
feminist legal thinkers as panelists and members of the Appellate Body
and reformulate the way in which it approaches trade issues affecting
women. The WTO could do this by relinquishing jurisdiction over trade
issues that involve women's rights to tribunals that more readily incor-
porate feminist viewpoints in their legal decisions. Realistically,
however, member states of the WTO are unlikely to decrease the juris-
diction of the WTO because that would decrease the body's
effectiveness.
An alternative approach would be for the WTO to become more
deferential to international human rights law, both to interpretations by
human rights tribunals and to the obligations and rules in these legal
regimes. This deference would require a paradigm shift in the theoreti-
cal approach to the interaction of human rights law and trade law.
Rather than separating human rights law and trade law into two equal,
non-intersecting spheres of law, human rights law should at least pro-
vide the basis for decisions affecting human rights made by trade
tribunals. Preferably, human rights law should supersede trade law.
There are legitimate objections to uniting international human rights
law and trade law. One argument is that the two bodies of law should be
kept separate to avoid potential problems dealing with the conflict of
laws and jurisdiction. The fear is that there might be a conflict of law
between the WTO and "traditional" sources of and courts of human
rights law.'5
This concern can be eased if the Appellate Body defers to the juris-
prudence of human rights courts and the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) whenever a conflict arises. If the Appellate Body does not defer
to these other sources of law either by refusing to address a human
rights issue or by denying the existence of human rights, injured parties
14. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 625 (1991).
15. It is unclear whether the WTO has exclusive power in the realm of trade law. The
International Court of Justice stated in dictum in the Nicaragua case that an explicit treaty on
embargoes could trump customary law. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). The WTO may have primary jurisdiction over WTO trade
issues because of the existence of the GATT treaty but it is less clear whether the WTO has
primary jurisdiction over trade issues that involve significant tangential non-trade issues.
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should be allowed to vindicate their rights through other forums, such as
the I.C.J.16
Another concern is that international human rights law might be
diluted if trade bodies were allowed to interpret and apply it. At least
one panel has been willing to grant itself considerable power to interpret
issues considered "tangential" to trade measures. An example is the In-
dia Quantitative Restrictions case, in which the WTO panel declared
that it was competent to review balance of payment measures even
though there already existed a Balance of Payment Committee within
the WTO."7 If human rights issues were litigated tangentially to trade
issues before the WTO, a panel might determine that it has the compe-
tency to address the human rights issues. The panel might then
unilaterally interpret human rights law in a manner that does not address
nor represent the current trends in international human rights law. This
fear can be mitigated if the WTO is constrained by an institutional
practice of deference to the interpretations of human rights law in hu-
man rights courts and to obligations in other institutional spaces.'8 In
addition, this concern is alleviated because the WTO is restricted by the
text of its own treaties. '9
Human rights law must be united with trade law because trade law
does not exist independently of the individuals whom it affects. Profes-
sor Nussbaum argues that economic, social, and legal institutions often
treat women as a means to an end . Women are treated as a means of
generating the end products of trade, rather than as ends in their own
rights.
When a woman is regarded as a means to some end, her capabilities
• 22
as a human being are not realized. Human capability is measured by
16. The author is not aware of any panel or Appellate Body reports under current WTO
jurisprudence that advocate this procedure.
17. See India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Indus-
trial Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS90/R, para. 5.114 (Apr. 6, 1999) [hereinafter India
Quantitative Restrictions Panel]. But see India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agri-
cultural, Textile and Industrial Products, Report of The Appellate Body, WT/DS90/AB/R,
para. 18 (Aug. 23, 1999) (noting that the Panel did not conclude that the competence of pan-
els to review balance-of-payments restrictions is "unlimited").
18. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 33-38.
19. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 72-79.
20. See MARTHA C. NuSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 5-6, 70-80
(2000).
21. See id. at 5-6 (paraphrasing language of Professor Nussbaum); Ontiveros, supra
note 5, at 31 (explaining that in contingent employment arrangements the employer values
only what the worker produces and places no emphasis on the individual's contribution or
connection to the enterprise).
22. NUSSBAUM, supra note 20, at 5-6, 70-86.
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what a person is actually able to do and to be.23 Certain functions are
particularly central in human life, in the sense that their presence or ab-
sence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence of
human life. 24 To do these functions in a truly human way, and not in a
merely animalistic way, is what it means to be human and to possess
human dignity. 5 Professor Nussbaum argues that the ultimate political
goal of a nation is the promotion of these capabilities above a certain
threshold level for each and every person in the nation.26
Human capabilities should be a priority in international human
rights law.27 Human capabilities should be promoted as "general princi-
ples." In international law, "general principles" are derived from
common principles in national legal systems.28 Similarly, a list of human
capabilities to be protected could be derived from national legal systems
and agreed to by international consensus.29 This list of human capabili-
ties would then be juristically defined as general principles of
international law. The WTO judicial bodies and the member states
would then be able to invoke these general principles in addition to the
GATT treaty and WTO jurisprudence." Thus, a nation could justify
23. Id. at 5.
24. See id. at 71-72.
25. See id. at 72-73 (providing an example put forth by Marx: a starving individual
does not eat food in a fully human way; rather, the individual grabs at the food like an ani-
mal does in order to survive).
26. Id. at 5, 74.
27. The traditional sources of international law are: international conventions or agree-
ments, custom, general principles of law common to the major legal systems of the world,
the judicial decisions and teachings of distinguished writers, and peremptory norms of inter-
national law (jus cogens). See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 59
T.S. No. 933, 3 Bevans 1153, art. 38(c) (listing "general principles" as a primary source of
international law). But see American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law § 102(2) (1987) (listing "general principles" as supplementary rules). This paper has
chosen to follow Professor Nussbaum's suggestion not to use the language of "rights" when
discussing human rights under international law. Professor Nussbaum suggests not using the
language of "rights" because people differ on the theoretical makeup of rights. Instead,
rights can be understood as "combined capabilities." A human right is a combination of the
political right to do or to be something and the capability to realize that right. For example, a
nation's laws may guarantee the right of free speech, but a woman may not be able to exer-
cise that right if she is threatened with violence every time she leaves her home. See id. at
96-101.
28. Historically, general principles have been characterized as "gap-fillers," to be used
only when there is no treaty- or custom-based law. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1993).
29. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 20, at 104.
30. Professor Nussbaum believes that "[w]here particularly egregious violations of hu-
man dignity and personhood are at issue, it seems appropriate for nations to use economic
and other strategies to secure compliance [with general principles of human capabilities]."
Id.
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taking trade measures to protect women by referring to general princi-
ples of international law.
Ideally, human capabilities should be characterized and promoted as
peremptory norms. Peremptory norms are obligations from which
derogation is not permitted. Peremptory norms can invalidate any other
source of international law and can only be invalidated themselves by a
subsequent peremptory norm.' Peremptory norms give rise to
obligations erga omnes in which states are held to have a legal interest
in the protection of obligations to the international community as a
whole. 2 If the protection of a human capability attains the status of a
peremptory norm, international law would not permit the WTO and
Member States to derogate from that norm.
In addition, the WTO should defer to interpretations of human
rights law by other tribunals. The WTO Appellate Body has shown a
willingness to be deferential to interpretations of other tribunals. In the
Bananas case, the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the WTO
should give deference, albeit limited, to the Lome Convention.33 The
Appellate Body determined that because the Contracting Parties to the
GATT had incorporated a reference to the Lome Convention and the
Lome Waiver, the WTO should examine the provisions of the Lome
Convention independently of the European Communities insofar as it is
necessary to interpret the Lome Waiver. 4 In other words, the Appellate
Body declined to accept the European Communities' interpretation of
the Lome Convention and the Lome Waiver but agreed that it must nev-
ertheless interpret and defer to the text of the Convention and Waiver.
Although this Appellate Body report suggests that the WTO does not
need to be deferential to interpretations by other institutional spaces,
such as the European Communities, it is important to note that the Ap-
pellate Body does not specifically address whether the WTO should be
deferential to interpretations by other tribunals.35
31. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
32. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, paras. 33-34 (Feb. 5, 1970).
33. See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, Sep. 9, 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R [hereinafter Ba-
nanas]. The Lome Convention is a European Union agreement setting up a preferential
trading arrangement for developing countries. See Fourth Lome Convention, African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific States-European Community, Dec. 15, 1989, art. 4, 29 I.L.M. 783; Raj
Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 839, 849 (2000).
34. See Bananas, para. 167 (quoting language from the panel report).
35. At least one panel has been willing to defer to interpretations by other institutional
spaces. See United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS160/R, paras. 6.47-6.55, 6.60-6.66 (June 15, 2000) (deferring to the state practice of
and the interpretation by members of the Berne Convention when evaluating whether the
[Vol. 22:219
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Moreover, in Bananas, the Appellate Body seemed to imply that the
WTO could be deferential to the rules in other international law regimes
insomuch as the rules are somehow incorporated in the GATT itself and
do not conflict with the object and purposes of the GATT. In particular,
the Appellate Body declined to debate the existence of two separate re-
gimes for regulating tariffs, emphasizing that the actual issue before it
was whether the European Communities were permitted to use the other
alleged regime in order to escape the non-discrimination requirements
of the GATT.36 The Appellate Body reasoned that "[i]f, by choosing a
different legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying
different tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of non-
discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from different
Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination provisions
would be defeated. 37
Where other institutions are more sensitive to gender issues than the
WTO, the WTO should be deferential to other institutions' less gen-
dered interpretations. While it is not the purpose of this Note to
determine which institutions are more responsive to women's issues,
regimes to whom the WTO could defer include the International Labour
Organization (ILO) and the North American Agreement on Labor Co-
operation (NAALC), a side agreement of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The ILO in particular continues to cham-
pion its original mandate of improving workers' conditions, including
women workers, and of advocating domestic adoption of the principle
of equal remuneration for equal work.38 The NAALC requires Member
States to NAFTA to enforce their domestic labor laws.39 Implicit in this
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) incorporates
the implied exceptions in the Convention).
36. See id. paras. 189-90.
37. Id. para. 190.
38. See generally Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and
Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 65-66, nn. 266-67 (1999); International
Labour Organization, Bureau for Gender Equality, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/gender
(last modified Dec. 5, 2000); International Labour Organization, Gender Promotion Programme,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/ (last modified Nov. 28, 2000). Since the 1LO
has from its inception championed the cause of workers generally, including the plight of women
workers, it could be argued that the ILO possesses greater specialization and, consequently, com-
petency and legitimacy in addressing issues relating to women workers. See generally Steve
Chamovitz, Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: The OECD Study and Recent Develop-
ments in the Trade and Labour Standards Debate, 11 TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L. J. 131, 158-63
(1997) (arguing that the ILO is a better forum than the WTO to address issues of labor rights be-
cause the 1LO is specialized and competent).
39. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., art. 1 I(1)(m), 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
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requirement is that Member States are obligated to enforce their laws on
gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.
The WTO should further defer to the jurisprudence of human rights
courts that are sensitive to gender issues. The WTO Appellate Body has
shown that it is willing to be deferential to rules in other regimes. In the
E.C. Hormones decision, the WTO Appellate Body declined to
determine if the "precautionary principle"' had crystallized into
customary international law.4' In particular, the Appellate Body noted
that prominent international legal scholars had not yet reached
consensus on the issue. 2 In addition, the Appellate Body declared in
dictum that the precautionary principle "finds reflection" in Article 5.7
of the Agreement on the Application and of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures ("SPS"), but that it is not directly written into the SPS as a
ground for justifying a measure that otherwise violates the SPS.
However, the Appellate Body noted, also in dictum, that this provision
does not exhaust the relevance of the precautionary principle for the
SpS.
43
Thus, the Appellate Body is willing to acknowledge that customary
international law or general principles of law may be relevant provided
there is a textual reference to the custom or principle in a trade agreement.
In E.C. Hormones, the Appellate Body implied that textual words in the
SPS that embody or allude to the precautionary principle were not enough
to justify exemption from the requirements of the SPS. As the panel in
India Quantitative Restrictions noted, "a precautionary principle cannot
be introduced into a treaty provision on the ground that it is a customary
principle of international law in the absence of a clear textual directive to
40. The "precautionary principle" in international environmental law refers to when
governments take measures to protect against a potential environmental harm even if the
scientific evidence linking a substance or activity to the harm in question is inconclusive or
uncertain. For an excellent discussion of the WTO's treatment of the "precautionary princi-
ple," see Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World
Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 271, 288-90 (2000) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Health and
Biosafety]. See also Kathleen A. Ambrose, Science and the WTO, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 861, 861-68 (2000) (arguing that the precautionary principle operates as a trade bar-
ier); Craig Thorn & Marinn Carlson, The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 841, 841-54 (2000); J. Martin Wagner, The WTO's Interpretation of the
SPS Agreement has Undermined the Right of Governments to Establish Appropriate Levels
of Protection Against Risk, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 855, 858-59 (2000) (condemning
the WTO's treatment of the precautionary principle in E.C. Hormones and advocating that
governments should be allowed to invoke the precautionary principle as a defense).
41. See E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R para. 123 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter E.C. Hormones].
42. See id.
43. See id. para. 124; Charnovitz, Health and Biosafety, supra note 40, at 288-90.
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do so." 44 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body in E.. Hormones was willing
to acknowledge that the precautionary principle may already be in the
process of becoming customary international law or a general principle
of international law. By negative inference, the Appellate Body seemed
to be saying that if a rule or principle had acquired a sufficiently high
status it could even trump treaty law.45
What is unclear is what level of status would a rule or principle need
to attain in order to trump treaty law. In a footnote in E.. Hormones, the
Appellate Body noted that, in a case between Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary, the I.C.J. had also recognized that new norms and standards have
been developed in the field of environmental protection.46 The Appellate
Body further noted that the I.C.J. did not identify the precautionary
principle as one of those recently developed norms and that it also de-
clined to declare that such a principle could override the obligations of
the treaty between Czechoslovakia and Hungary.47 Although under in-
ternational law, custom and general principles cannot trump the GATT
because it is a treaty, the WTO should still defer to custom and general
principles and must defer to peremptory norms in its application and
evaluation of the public morals exception.
II. PROTECTING WOMEN'S RIGHTS UNDER
THE TEXT OF ARTICLE XX
Article XX lists several particular circumstances in which a con-
48tracting party to the GATT may implement trade restrictions. Member
countries may take trade measures for specific reasons, such as refusing
to trade in products made from slave labor. Measures can also be taken
for more general reasons, such as refusing to trade in products that con-
travene public morals. A nation may apply trade measures to protect its
nationals or to protect the nationals of the nation against whom the trade
measure is directed. The chapeau (preamble) of Article XX limits use of
such trade measures, forbidding member countries from applying Arti-
cle XX in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. As inter-
preted by Feddersen, Article XX creates a two part test, in which an
44. India Quantitative Restrictions Panel, supra note 17, art. 3.189. For similar lan-
guage, see Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
45. I owe this insight to Professor Robert Howse.
46. See E.C. Hormones, supra note 41, at n.93.
47. See id.
48. GATr, supra note 1, art. XX(a)-(j).
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action taken by a contracting party must first be a measure under one of
subparagraphs (a)-(j) and then meet the additional requirements of the
chapeau.49
Trade measures designed to protect women can be justified by the
text of Article XX under two approaches. First, measures taken to
protect women can be justified under the more specific categories in
Article XX, such as the exception for environmental protection in
Article XX(g). Second, measures to protect women can be justified
under the public morals exception in Article XX(a). In particular, the
public morals exception in Article XX(a) should be interpreted in light
of evolving international law on women's rights and rights related to
gender. Protecting women under the public morals exception will not
open a floodgate of claims under the exception; claims under this
exception are limited by the specific language of Article XX(a) and by
the chapeau in Article XX.
Article XX should be interpreted broadly. In the Turtles decision,
the Appellate Body seemed receptive to a broad interpretation of Article
XX. The Turtles case involved complaints lodged against an attempt by
the United States to protect sea turtles. The United States sought to
protect the sea turtles by prohibiting the importation of certain shrimp
and shrimp products under Section 609 of the Public Law 101-162.o
India, Pakistan, and Thailand argued that sea turtles did not constitute
an "exhaustible natural resource" under Article XX(g).5' These nations
argued that a "reasonable interpretation" of "exhaustible" is that the
term refers to finite resources such as minerals, rather than biological or
renewable resources.52 They also noted that, in the drafting history of
Article XX(g), some delegations had referred specifically to minerals as
scarce natural resources. 3 The Panel first evaluated the trade measure
under the chapeau and thus did not determine whether sea turtles con-
stitute an exhaustible natural resource under paragraph (g).54
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's "chapeau-down" approach,
and determined that the United States' actions served a legitimate, envi-
ronmental objective under XX(g). 5 In doing so, the Appellate Body
noted that modem science has shown that living creatures can be
49. Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and "Conventional" Rules of Inter-
pretation, 7 MINN. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 92 (1998). This Note applies Fedderson's approach.
50. See generally Turtles, supra note 3.
51. See id. para. 127.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. paras. 127, 186.
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"exhaustible resources."56 Most importantly, the Appellate Body held
that the meaning of Article XX(g) ("conservation of exhaustible natural
resources") could be interpreted in light of developments in interna-
tional environmental law.57 The Appellate Body observed that "lt]he
words of Article XX(g), 'exhaustible natural resources,' were actually
crafted more than 50 years ago ... [and] must be read by a treaty inter-
preter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment. '"8
The Appellate Body concluded that the signatories to the GATT
recognized the legitimacy of environmental protection because the pre-
amble to the 1994 WTO Agreement explicitly refers to the objective of
"sustainable development."59 The preamble states:
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensur-
ing full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding production of
and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development .... 60
The Appellate Body determined that the reference to "natural re-
sources" in Article XX(g) is "evolutionary," not "static," and should be
61
read in light of recent international law. Since many modern interna-
tional conventions and declarations refer to natural resources as
embracing both living and non-living resources, the Appellate Body
determined that it is "too late in the day" to suppose that Article XX(g)
may be read as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral
62
or non-living natural resources.
However, after concluding. that. sea turtles are "exhaustible natural
resources" and that the U.S.'s measure falls under the ambit of Article
XX(g), the Appellate Body determined that the measure violated the
requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.63 Specifically, the Appellate
56. See id. para. 128.
57. See id. para. 129.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. para. 130.
62. See id. paras. 130-31.
63. See id. para. 186.
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Body determined that the measure had been applied in a manner that
constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. 6
If the protection of women is part of the evolving international law
on the protection of the environment, a WTO member might be able to
justify measures taken to protect women under Article XX(g). The
United Nations' Beijing Declaration suggests that the eradication of
poverty and its particular burden on women should be based not only on
sustainable development but also on environmental protection. 6 Thus, if
the WTO were to follow its commitment in Turtles to interpret Article
XX(g) in light of evolving environmental law, a trade measure to pro-
tect women might be justified under this paragraph.
If the WTO is unwilling to "stretch" international environmental
law to protect women or if the WTO believes that such a connection has
not yet crystallized into hard international law, a member might be able
to justify such measures under the public morals exception in Article
XX(a). To do so, the public morals exception should be interpreted
broadly to include evolving international law on women's rights and
rights related to gender.6'
The public morals exception operates as a catch-all for measures
that do not squarely fit under any of the other exceptions in Article XX.
For example, Article XX(e) pertains only to products of prison labor.
According to the negotiating history of the GATT, the prison labor ex-
ception was intended to be specific and was not meant to include other
forms of "prohibited" labor.67 In other words, the drafters of the GATT
64. See id.
65. See John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human
Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 283, 329-31 (2000) (arguing that environmental concerns are linked to
women's rights through the effects of poverty on women and that such a linkage has been
recognized through several conferences and declarations of the United Nations, including the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, and the
Vienna Declaration); see also Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World
Conference on Women, 16th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20.Add.I (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401 (addressing how women will be
incorporated into the goals of sustainable development) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
66. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers'
Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 131, 142-45 (1999) (arguing that an interpretation
of the public morals exception as including labor rights might be based on evidence of inter-
national law's evolving concern with the social dimensions of trade) [hereinafter Howse,
Workers' Rights].
67. See Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the
World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. R. 565, 570-71 (1987). In
1927, a League of Nations conference agreed to exempt import prohibitions applying to
prison-made goods. In 1947, this exemption was then included in Article XX(e) of the
GATT. The United States tried unsuccessfully on three occasions to expand the prohibition
on prison labor to include express limitation on "involuntary" forms of labor. Id. See also
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included the prison labor exception in order to emphasize that members
could take measures against others who engaged in the particular evil of
prison labor. Perhaps, the drafters felt that other practices, such as slave
labor, were so universally prohibited that there would be so few or no
incidents of members engaging in such practices. 68 This prohibition on
the products of prison labor can be viewed as a "carve out" from the
general prohibition on goods made in contravention to public morals.
When Article XX was drafted, the plight of women in the interna-
tional economic order had not yet been recognized and thus, no specific
provision for the protection of women was included. However, just as
other prohibited labor practices (e.g., indentured child labor)69 fall under
the catch-all of the public morals exception, ° so should prohibited labor
practices concerning women.
Moreover, Article XX(a) should be interpreted in light of the pre-
amble of the WTO Agreement. While there is no explicit reference to
women's rights in the WTO preamble, there is a reference to achieving
the goal of "sustainable development." The goal of "sustainable devel-
opment" includes the betterment of women.7' Assuming sustainable
development is a goal worth protecting, measures taken to protect
women's development can be justified under the public morals excep-
tion as being in line with the preamble's goal of sustainable
development. What is unclear is whether measures taken to protect
women in order to achieve the goal of sustainable development should
be limited only to economic development.
Using the public morals exception would not open a floodgate of
sanctions. Article XX(a) uses the words "necessary to" when describing
the protection of public morals. Other exceptions in Article XX use the
words "relating to," "in pursuance of," "essential," "for the protection
Steve Charnovitz, Fair Labor Standards and International Trade, 20 J. WORLD TRADE 61,
62-67 (1986) (providing a historical overview of American policies linking international fair
labor standards with trade).
68. See Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 2, at 705-10 (providing references to
numerous anti-slavery treaties prohibiting trade for moral reasons, which pre-dated the ne-
gotiating history of the GATT.
69. Diller and Levy propose that well-established rules of international law compel the
harmonization of international trade rules with international labor and human rights norms
that prohibit the most exploitative, or extreme, forms of child labor. In particular, the authors
argue that obligations under the multilateral trade regime can be interpreted and imple-
mented in light of either higher values, represented by peremptory norms of customary
international law, or common commitments, where parties to international trade obligations
are also bound by international human rights and labor law. Janelle M. Diller and David A.
Levy, Note and Comment: Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization
of International Law 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663 (1997).
70. See Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 2, at 696-97.
71. See Beijing Declaration, supra note 65, at 401.
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of," or "involving." As the Appellate Body noted in the Reformulated
Gasoline decision, the drafters of Article XX probably did not intend to
require, in respect to each and every category, the same kind or degree
of connection between the measure under appraisal and the state interest
or policy sought to be promoted or realized." Most likely, the exception
categories using the words "necessary to" require that the measure taken
be tailored for a particular issue.
In contrast, the words "relating to" suggest that the measure taken
may be in conjunction with other measures taken. Thus, broader meas-
ures would be more easily justified if they were to fall under an
exception with the language "relating to" than with the language
"necessary to." Consequently, a nation invoking the public morals ex-
ception would still need to show that the trade measure taken was more
than related to some aim but that it was perhaps the only effective man-
ner in which to achieve that aim. This would prevent a flood of claims
under the public morals exception because the claims would need to be
more narrowly tailored than claims under other exceptions.
In addition, the chapeau of Article XX will prevent a flood of meas-
ures taken under the public morals exception. As previously discussed,
after a measure has been classified as one of the enumerated exceptions
under Article XX, it must satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XX. The chapeau states that the application of any measure jus-
tified under Article XX must not constitute "a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."73
In the Turtles decision, the Appellate Body explained "unjustifiable
discrimination" as relating to the even-handedness with which measures
are applied, taking into account the conditions existing in different na-
tions.74 The Appellate Body then explained that "arbitrary discrimination"
occurs when sanctions are applied in a manner that does not respect due
process and transparency requirements.75 While the Appellate Body has
not yet addressed the meaning of "a disguised restriction on international
trade," Professor Howse suggests that it is "an amplification of some
dimensions of the prohibition of 'arbitrary discrimination,' particularly
the concern for transparent and rules-based application of measures. 76
72. See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of
the Appellate Body, WTIDS2/ABJR (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline].
73. GATr, supra note 1, art. XX.
74. See Turtles, supra note 3, para. 161-76; Howse, Workers' Rights, supra note 66, at
145.
75. See Turtles, supra note 3, para. 161-76; Howse, Workers' Rights, supra note 66 at
145.
76. Howse, Workers' Rights, supra note 66, at 145.
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Thus, a nation invoking the public morals exception would still need to
prove that the measures in question do not amount to unjustifiable or
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Professor Howse has argued that in the labor context, a measure
might be considered "unjustified discrimination" not only if the measure
were not applied equally to all countries with similar labor rights com-
pliance problems, but also if the measure did not take into consideration
the relevant special circumstances of certain countries. 7  For example, in
the child labor context, an application of sanctions might be deemed as
"unjustified discrimination" if directed at the traditional, non-exploitive
use of underage workers in small, family-based agriculture.78
In the context of the situation of female labor, it could be argued
that a sanction might be considered "unjustified discrimination" if it
were aimed at the "non-exploitative" use of women's labor. For exam-
ple, it might be "unjustified discrimination" to target a nation which
provides government-run programs to encourage women, and only
women, to become nurses. While nursing in America is deemed an un-
derpaid "women's profession," such an educational program might be
considered progressive in a nation that generally lacks female workers
in the medical profession.
However, there are actions that a nation takes that cannot be justi-
fied as cultural relativism. For example, slavery is universally
understood in international law to be prohibited; the prohibition on slav-
ery is a peremptory norm or jus cogens. Although slavery is not
enumerated as an exception in Article XX, it falls under the public mor-
als exception. Assuming a trade measure taken falls squarely under
Article XX, the targeted nation might still argue that the initiating na-
tion has unjustifiably discriminated against it. The targeted nation might
argue that, due to a severe drought, it has to "force" people to work so
as not to throw the nation into an economic depression. The targeted
nation might further argue that even if such forced work constitutes
slavery, it is nevertheless allowable in this situation; and, thus, any trade
measure taken against the nation because of its policy of forced labor
would constitute unjustifiable discrimination.
Yet, even if targeting this nation constitutes discrimination, the dis-
crimination would be justified because the nation has violated a
peremptory norm. If a nation violates a peremptory norm, that nation's
particular circumstances do not need to be taken into consideration. In
addition, if the trade measure were taken to protect a peremptory norm,
77. See id.
78. Id.
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the initiating nation would not be subject to the chapeau requirement
that the trade measure not be "unjustified."
Thus, the text of Article XX and, in particular, the public morals ex-
ception, can be used to justify trade measures to protect women.
III. MEASURES To PROTECT WOMEN THAT SHOULD
BE JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE XX(a)
This Note attempts to show that issues concerning women can and
should be incorporated into the WTO regime and that trade measures to
protect women can be justified under the public morals exception. Be-
fore providing examples of how to use the public morals exception to
protect women's rights, it is necessary to distinguish between the differ-
ent types of trade measures.
Charnovitz has divided trade measures into those that are
"outwardly-directed" and those that are "inwardly-directed."79 Out-
wardly-directed trade measures are used to protect the morals of
foreigners residing outside one's own country, while inwardly-directed
trade measures are used to protect the morals of people in one's own
nation.80 Outwardly-directed trade measures can be aimed at a particular
practice within the targeted nation or enacted for general human rights
reasons." Depending on the circumstances, export and import bans can
be categorized as outwardly-directed, inwardly-directed, or a combina-
tion thereof.82
A number of trade measures can be justified under the public morals
exception that are not justified under any other exception in Article XX.
One outwardly-directed moral purpose of trade measures is to protect
foreign workers. 3 A nation could justify restrictive trade measures
aimed at protecting female workers in foreign countries. Given that the
Article XX(e) exception is restricted to prison labor, labor practices
which adversely affect women, but do not fall under this exception,
79. See Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 2, at 695 (providing specific examples
of "outwardly-directed" and "inwardly-directed" trade measures).
80. Id. Terms that have been employed to describe laws which seek to promote values
in foreign nations are "extrajurisdictional" and "extraterritorial." Id.
81. See id. at 694-99.
82. See id. at 695-96.
83. For example, in 1997, the U.S. Congress passed a law forbidding the importation of
products made by forced or indentured children labor. As discussed above, this trade meas-
ure is not covered by Article XX(e) because that exception applies only to the products of
prison labor. See id. at 696; see also Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61, § 634, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997); Diller & Levy, supra note 69,
at 682, 688-89.
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could be covered under the public morals exception. In particular, the
United States could use the public morals exception to justify a policy
of restricting imports from a nation engaging in the specific practices of
unequal wages for equal work, resistance to unionization, pregnancy
discrimination, sexual discrimination in hiring, sexual harassment,
and/or rape in the workplace.
In addition, the United States could use the public morals exception
to justify enacting trade measures for general human rights reasons,
such as preventing the importation of goods from a nation that engages
in human rights abuses of women. Trade measures could be employed
to object to domestic violence, female genital mutilation, bride-burning,
forced abortions or sterilization, forced marriages, female infanticide,
prostitution, and trafficking in women.
While some human rights abuses may fall under Article XX(b)
("necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health"), it is not
readily apparent that all human rights abuses against women would fall
under this exception. For example, the denial of women's property
rights may be more appropriately addressed under the public morals
exception. The denial of property rights does not present an immediate
threat to human life or health but it does affect the ability of women to
exercise other human capabilities. As Kurshan has explained,
Inequality in property rights is a major hindrance to correcting
internationally recognized problems women face such as gener-
ally inferior economic status, domestic violence, and female
genital mutilation. Without property rights, it is difficult for
women to be individual economic actors. In order to survive,
people who are not economic actors must attach themselves to
people who are. In that situation, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for a woman to exercise any right in a way that risks
estranging her from that economic actor. This reality keeps
women in an inferior position within marriages, families, and
society.84
Moreover, the denial of women's property rights violates interna-
tional conventions, such as the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights, which covers nations in the Organization of American States
84. Leslie Kurshan, Rethinking Property Rights as Human Rights: Acquiring Equal
Property Rights for Women Using International Human Rights Treaties, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 357-58 (2000) (describing discriminatory practices and provisions in
nations of the Organization of American States which deprive women of their property rights
but which could be challenged by women under international human rights law).
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("OAS").85 For example, in many countries within the OAS, women do
not have equal property rights in law or in practice.86 Thus, if the United
States believes that a nation within the OAS is not improving its female
citizens' access to equal property rights, the United States could justi-
fiably pressure that nation into improving access by enacting restrictive
trade measures against it under the public morals exception.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, WTO member nations are legally allowed under the
public morals exception to take restrictive trade measures against na-
tions that violate women's rights. Most importantly, given the poverty,
discrimination, and violence that women currently face, WTO members
should take restrictive trade measures against nations that violate
women's rights.
85. See id. at 358; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, arts. 1-2, 21, 24, 25. The following nations are parties to this Convention:
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
86. See Kurshan, supra note 84, at 358.
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